State Terrorism in Sudan - UCF Global Perspectives and International Initiatives

Since April 15, 2023, the North African country of Sudan has been facing a civil war and subsequent humanitarian crisis, leading to mass civilian casualties, suffering, and extensive destruction (Amnesty International). The catalyst for this war was the outbreak of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group under Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti (Reuters, 1).

Prior to the civil war, these former military leaders played a role in the overthrow of the former Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir (Reuters, 1). Since the war began, as the two military leaders vie for supremacy and disregard the transitional government, the conflict has escalated into a large-scale humanitarian crisis (Global Conflict Tracker). Sources indicate that more than 15,000 people have been killed, over 8 million have been displaced, and 25 million need humanitarian or food-related assistance (Global Conflict Tracker). The UN World Food Program estimates that 24.6 million Sudanese people (~50% of the population) are facing acute food insecurity while 638,000 – the highest worldwide – face “catastrophic levels of hunger.” (UN WFP)

In addition to the widespread violence and food insecurity, the country’s weakening medical facilities and faculties are facing a downward spiral. With over two-thirds of all main hospitals in impacted areas out of service; shortages of essential necessities such as staff, safe water, electricity, and supplies; and with transportation of supplies and medical workers being targeted the country’s health care is progressively degenerating (UN WHO). Both the SAF and RSF have committed deliberate attacks on healthcare facilities, personnel, and supplies. Coupled with widespread gender-based violence, the RSF has pillaged medical supplies and targeted several medical personnel (Human Rights Watch). On the other side, the SAF has forcibly restricted humanitarian supplies, aid workers, and imposed a blockade on any drugs or medications from entering RSF-controlled areas of Khartoum since October of 2023 (Human Rights Watch).

The international response to the crisis has been criticized as slow and ineffective (Amnesty International). Amnesty International reported a year after the conflict that the UN Security Council took nearly a year to adopt a resolution calling for hostilities to cease and for humanitarian access and aid. However, these efforts were reported as underfunded, with the UN World Food Program’s appeal for famine aid receiving only 5% of the necessary funding (Amnesty International). Resultingly, the U.S. Treasury Department only imposed sanctions against Burhan on January 16, 2025—nearly two years after the conflict began—following sanctions imposed on his rival, Hemedti, just a week earlier (Reuters, 2). Burhan has been accused of indiscriminate shelling of war zones, targeting civilian infrastructure, and carrying out extrajudicial killings (Reuters, 2).

On the other hand, the RSF has been officially accused of systemic genocide by the ICC, following its campaign in Darfur (Yale School of Public Health). Since then, it has also been accused of mass ethnic cleansing, rape, torture, and other atrocities similar to those committed by Burhan (Yale School of Public Health). Both leaders played key roles in the counterinsurgency campaign and genocide in Darfur, which began in 2003 (BBC). This prolonged conflict has been fueled by both figures seeking support from foreign backers and financers to gain an advantage over one another (Reuters, 1). As both state-backed military groups commit documented war crimes, they exemplify state terrorism in action.

State terrorism is defined by the University of Birmingham as “…similar to non-state terrorism in that it involves politically, ideologically, or religiously inspired acts of violence against individuals or groups outside of an armed conflict. The key difference is that agents of the state are carrying out the violence” (University of Birmingham). Both the SAF and RSF are state actors—the SAF being the official Sudanese military and the RSF originally emerging from the Janjaweed militia before being repackaged by Omar al-Bashir in 2013 to safeguard his regime from internal threats (Al Jazeera).

As of now, the RSF has faced numerous U.S. Treasury sanctions, both against companies and firms supporting it and against individual leaders (Reuters 2). The U.S. Treasury cited its reasons for sanctioning Hemedti in January 2025, including the killing of tens of thousands, the displacement of millions of Sudanese, and triggering widespread food insecurity and starvation. Additionally, the RSF has been found guilty of committing genocide in Darfur, engaging in war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, widespread sexual violence, executing civilians and unarmed fighters, and weaponizing the denial of humanitarian relief against the Sudanese people (U.S. Treasury, 1).

Leading up to this, the U.S. Treasury issued sanctions against numerous RSF leaders and generals, including Abdel Rahman Joma’a Bakrallah for violence in West Darfur, and Ali Yagboub Gibril and Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed for war crimes in North Darfur (U.S. Treasury, 2/3). The SAF has faced similar accusations, with the U.S. Treasury imposing sanctions in 2024 against Mirghani Idris Suleiman, an SAF leader, for illegally procuring weapons from Iranian and Russian sources and perpetrating violence rather than pursuing diplomatic channels to end the conflict (U.S. Treasury, 4). In 2025, the U.S. Treasury finally sanctioned General Burhan, citing his intentional lethal attacks against civilians, protected infrastructure, and his routine denial and weaponization of food and aid access as a war tactic (U.S. Treasury, 5). As recently as January 31, 2025, the UN reported targeted summary executions of civilians, including women, in northern Khartoum by the SAF (UN News).

The conflict in Sudan extends beyond the atrocities committed by actors within the state itself, as several countries have been accused of funding and influencing the war (Reuters, 1). Among the key players, Egypt, a neighboring country, has actively supported Burhan, hosting him and his representatives for multiple visits and mediation conferences (Reuters, 1). Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has provided aid and air support to the SAF (Foreign Policy). Additionally, the SAF has been using Iranian-made drones and UAVs, despite Tehran’s diplomatic denials of involvement. Critics argue that Iran has strategic interests in Sudan’s coastline and ports along the Red Sea, a competitive region for global powers (Reuters, 3).

One of the key drivers of foreign support in Sudan is the country’s resource wealth, particularly gold (New York Times). This competition is most evident in the roles of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with Saudi Arabia backing the SAF and the UAE supporting the RSF (Foreign Policy). After the fall of Bashir, both countries pledged $3 billion in aid to the transitional government (Foreign Policy). Independently, the UAE had invested $7.6 billion in Sudan before Bashir’s fall and an additional $6 billion into agricultural projects and a Red Sea port, while Saudi Arabia announced plans to invest up to $24 billion in Sudan’s infrastructure, mining, and agricultural sectors (Foreign Policy).

Hemedti seized several gold mines around Darfur and, weeks later, took $150 million in gold from the country’s national refinery. Reports indicate that in 2024 alone, $860 million worth of gold was extracted from Darfur (New York Times). The U.S. later sanctioned two UAE-based firms for their connections to the RSF (U.S. Treasury, 6). However, even Emirati companies linked to the royal family own the largest industrial mine in Sudan, controlled by the SAF, demonstrating the UAE’s involvement on both sides of the conflict (New York Times). The exact volume of gold exported to the UAE remains unclear, but Swiss Aid reported that between 2012 and 2022, 2,596 tons of gold were smuggled undeclared from Africa to the UAE (Swiss Aid).

Beyond gold, Emirati extractive policies extend to Sudan’s agricultural sector. The UAE’s largest corporation, IHC, controls more than 50,000 hectares of land in Sudan (Middle East Eye). Meanwhile, the Abu Hamad farming project, linked to 165,000 hectares of land, is connected to a Red Sea port operation that entitles Sudan to only 35% of the profits (Middle East Eye). Reportedly, the UAE imports at least 80% of its agricultural products (USDA GRAIN).

As of January 2025, U.S. lawmakers have concluded that the UAE has been supplying arms to the RSF and are now working to block further arms sales, despite Emirati officials consistently denying any involvement beyond humanitarian aid (Reuters, 4). This competition for Sudanese gold has also drawn in Russia and the Wagner Group. Organizations have reported weapons transfers from Russian air bases in Libya to Sudan (All Eyes on Wagner). Hemedti has received Russian weapons and training for years, strengthening ties with Russia as it expanded its influence in Africa following the 2014 annexation of Crimea and later the 2022 invasion of Ukraine (CNN).

Additionally, reports suggest connections between Wagner, Emirati interests, and Sudanese gold mines, with the UAE shipping much of this gold to Russia (Foreign Policy). Wagner’s activities in Sudan have even prompted Ukrainian special forces to intervene in support of the SAF against the RSF-Wagner alliance (Reuters, 1). The involvement of these numerous global actors has heavily contributed to the deteriorating conditions in Sudan and the continuation of the civil war.

Works Cited:

Reuters:

Reuters 1, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-conflict-whos-backing-rival-commanders-2023-05-03/

Reuters 2, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-impose-sanctions-sudanese-leader-burhan-2025-01-16/

Reuters 3, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/are-iranian-drones-turning-tide-sudans-civil-war-2024-04-10/

Reuters 4, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-lawmakers-find-uae-provides-weapons-sudan-rsf-uae-denies-this-2025-01-24/

U.S. Treasury

U.S. Treasury 1, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2772

U.S. Treasury 2, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2710#:~:text=Among%20other%20acts%2C%20the%20RSF,people%20amidst%20the%20broader%20war

U.S. Treasury 3, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2340

U.S. Treasury 4, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2672

U.S. Treasury 5, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789