Since the collapse of the brief rapprochement which followed the end of the Cold War, Russia and the West have continued to compete for influence in a number of regions (DGAP 1). Most visibly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — an operation which Russia believed would grant control of the country within three days — has instead led to Europe’s longest full-scale war since World War II (NPR). While Russia has repeatedly justified the invasion as a defensive effort against aggressive NATO expansion, several leaders of European Union (EU) member states have dubbed the conflict a renewal of Russian efforts at empire in Europe (The Guardian). Elsewhere, Russia experiences a shrinking presence in the Middle East following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, as well as the Balkans due to the threat of EU enlargement (BBC 1, DGAP 2). Despite Russia’s waning presence across these regions in recent years, it has also experienced geopolitical success in the Sahel region of Africa (BBC 2).
The Sahel refers to the transitional strip of land immediately south of the Sahara Desert. Stretching more than 5,000 km from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, the majority of the region encompasses parts of the modern-day countries which formerly comprised French West Africa (UNDP, Brussels International Center). In recent years, the Sahel has acquired the moniker the “coup belt” after nine successful military coups occurred across countries in the region between 2020 and 2023 (New York Times 1). While analysts cite a variety of motivating factors, many of the coups came in response to previous governments’ inability to combat the region’s significant terrorism problem (Stimson Center). For decades, Jihadist groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have launched indiscriminate attacks against civilians and government forces in the region (CIRIS). In 2024, 51 percent of global-terrorism related deaths occurred in the Sahel (CIRIS).
Among the Sahelian nations to experience coups in recent years, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have led a dramatic geopolitical realignment effort (BBC 2). These three nations formed the AES (Alliance of Sahel States) in 2023, after the Western-aligned ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) threatened military intervention in response to Niger’s military coup. The AES countries then expelled French military personnel from their territory, nationalized key industries and began forming closer ties with Russia (BBC 2). Analysts argue that this shift reflects the intersection of Sahelian attitudes towards France’s historic role in the region and the unaddressed Jihadist threat (CIRIS).
Among the colonial powers of history, France has retained a uniquely significant level of political, economic, and military influence with its former African colonies. African economists and intellectuals argue that this policy, colloquially referred to as “Françafrique”, has upheld the exploitative conditions which defined French colonialism in West Africa (Brussels International Center). Prior to 2023, France was largely dependent on Nigerien produced uranium to power its expansive nuclear infrastructure. However, Niger consistently benefited from only around 12% of the produced uranium’s market value and remained one of the poorest countries in the world (Brussels International Center). Similar resource-based exploitative practices effected Mali and Burkina Faso (BBC 2). Analysts argue that this dynamic was perpetuated through France’s imposed use of the CFA franc, a currency which is permanently pegged to the Euro (London School…). Historically, countries within the CFA franc were required to deposit half of their foreign reserves with the French treasury. In addition to this loss of economic sovereignty, the overvaluing of the CFA franc currency worked to benefit French firms and a select few African elites, while the majority of West Africa’s population remained locked out of economic opportunity (London School…).
At the same time as France began efforts to reform its policy in West Africa during the 2010s, the French military began a ground intervention against the region’s Jihadist insurgency (Brussels International Center). Operation Barkhane, France’s counterinsurgency operation which lasted from 2014 to 2022, would greatly exacerbate anti-French sentiment in the region. This was partly due to excessive civilian casualties. Additionally, the region’s Jihadist groups remained resilient and effectively used France’s interference in the region as propaganda to recruit new fighters (Brussels International Center). Sahelians came to view Operation Barkhane as both ineffective and another mechanism to uphold French regional dominance (CIRIS). These attitudes were behind the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, in which pro-French governments were ousted (New York Times 1).
Following the French military’s forced departure, the AES has allowed Russia to fill France’s shoes in the region (BBC 2). But since Russia’s Africa Corps (the successor company to the Wagner Group) took over regional security duties in recent years, terrorism remains a significant problem (CIRIS). On Sunday, April 26, Mali’s defense minister and key liaison to Russia, General Sadio Camara, was killed in a JNIM-linked attack (New York Times 2). Russian forces have faced several major defeats at the hands of Jihadist groups in the region and civilians continue to be targeted indiscriminately (New York Times 2). In several other ways, Russia’s presence in the region is reminiscent of France’s. Russia has expanded its foothold in the same key regional industries that France once did, and the Africa Corps is repeatedly accused of abuse against civilians (BBC 2). Furthermore, the Sahel’s population still faces rampant poverty and food insecurity (CIRIS). While Russia has made strides in the competition for global influence with the West, the Sahel’s people continue to bear the burden of regional instability.
References
BBC 1: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clygege97qwo
BBC 2: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckglwnrx437o
Brussels International Center: https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/francafrique-unveiling-anti-french-sentiments-and-frances-complex-role-africa
CIRIS: https://www.ciris.info/articles/security-illusions-russia-in-the-sahel/
DGAP 1: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russia-and-west-what-went-wrong-and-can-we-do-better
DGAP 2: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/eu-enlargement-transition
The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-himself-to-peter-the-great-in-quest-to-take-back-russian-lands
London School of Economics and Political Science: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/07/12/the-cfa-franc-french-monetary-imperialism-in-africa/
New York Times 1: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/world/africa/africa-coups-niger.html
New York Times 2: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/27/world/africa/mali-defense-minster-killed.html
NPR: https://www.npr.org/2026/02/24/nx-s1-5721139/russia-ukraine-war
Stimson Center: https://www.stimson.org/2026/uncovering-the-roots-of-crisis-in-the-sahel/
UNDP: https://featured.undp.org/sahel/